RECENT CASE NOTES by unknown
RECENT CASE NOTES
AGENCY-WARANTY OF AUTHORIT-EFFECT OF Fonm or AcTIoN IN
SuIT AGAINST AGENT.-The defendant, representing himself to be the
agent of a certain corporation, induced the plaintiff to audit the cor-
poration's books. The defendant was without authority. The lower court
sustained the plaintiff's action of contract, and the defendant excepted on
the ground that he was not responsible in contract. Held, that the ex-
ceptions be sustained, since an action of tort is the proper remedy against
an agent contracting without authority. Mcndelsohnu v. Holton (1925,
Mass.) 149 N.E. 38.
In all jurisdictions an agent is responsible in an action of deceit where
he represents that he has authority, knowing his statements to be false.
Pasley v. Freeman (1789, K. B.) 3 T. R. 51; 1 Mechem, Agency (2d ed.
1914) sec. 1365. That deceit should lie when there is no mala fides, but
where the language is spoken negligently, has been suggested. Smith,
Liability for Negligenat Language (1901) 14 HARv. L. REv. 184; contra:
Williston, Liability for Honest Misreprescntation (1911) 24 HARv. L. Rsv.
415, 436. Where the misrepresentation of authority 'was honestly made,
recovery has very generally been allowed, although the theories of recovery
have differed greatly. Formerly Massachugetts, New York, and many
other jurisdictions imposed responsibility by substituting the agent on the
contract itself in place of the principal he attempted to represent. Pai~zcr
v. Stephens (1845, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 1 Denio, 471; Hatch v. Smith (1809) 5
Mass. 42, 52. A few jurisdictions seem to retain the rule today. See
(1911) 34 L. R. A. (N.s.) 518, 525, note. New York, however, later
adopted the principle already recognaized iii England, that the agent's re-
sponsibility was founded in contract, on an implied warranty. Baltzcn v.
Nicolay (1873) 53 N. Y. 467; Collen v. Wright (1S57, Exch.) 8 El. &
Bl. 647. While Massachusetts grounds his responsibility in tort on the
theory of a false warranty. People's Nat. BI. of Boston r. Dixcwell k1914)
217 Mass. 436, 105 N. E. 435. This action is said to be in the nature of
deceit, even though the agent bona fide believes he has authority. Magaa,
v. Beals (1922) 242 Mlass. 321, 136 N. E. 174. Since Pasley v. Freeman,
supra, "fraud" and "deceit" have connoted a dishonest motive or at least
knowledge of the falsity. Williston, Liability for Honest .Misrcprcccata-
tion, supra. It seems, however, that the Massachusetts notion of "deceit"
as used in the warranty cases is more consistent with the original concept
of the action. 1 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 194. As to the dam-
ages obtainable under the three theories of recovery, it is obvious that
where the contract is said to be the agent's own, his damages will be limited
to the value of performance, unless the case falls within the doctrine of
Hadley v. Baxe2&,le (1854) 9 Exch. 341. But where the action sounds in
contract but is based on a breach of an implied warranty, the damages will
be allowed to embrace, as in a tort action, all the injury resulting from
his want of authority. Farner's Co-op. Trust Co. v. Floyd (1890) 47 Ohio
St. 525, 26 N.E. 110; Taylor v. Nostrand (1892) 134 N. Y. 10S, 31 N. E.
246. Where the case comes up under a code abolishing forms of action
it should be sufficient if the plaintiff states operative facts constituting a
cause of action. Clark, The Complaint in, Code Pleading (1926) 35 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 259, 282; Conaughty v,. Nichols (1870) 42 N. Y. 83. On the
other hand, some states rigidly require a theory in the pleadings. Chicago,
T. H. & S. E. R. Co. v. Collins (1924, Ind.) 143 N. E. 712. In such a state
prudence 'would dictate that the action be brought according to the ortho-
dox notion of recovery existent in that state.
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ALIENS-DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS-NAMING THE WRONG DEFENDANT
IN WARRANT OF ARREST HELD NOT TO INVALIDATE PROCEEDINGS IF FAIR
HEARING GIVEN.-A Chinese woman was arrested, and after a hearing a
warrant of deportation was issued against her. She petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground that she was not the person named in the
warrant of arrest upon which the proceedings were based. It appeared
that she was the person wanted, but that, through an error, the warrant
of arrest described another person of the same name. From a judgment
denying her petition she appealed. Held, that the appeal be denied, since
after a fair hearing the appellant was found to be subject to deportation.
Wong Shee v. Nagle (1925, C. C. A. 9th) 7 Fed. (2d) 612.
A final decision of the Labor Department on the facts in a question of
deportation is conclusive upon the courts when the hearing is fairly con-
ducted. United States V. Wong Lai (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 270 Fed. 57.
But the fairness of such a hearing is not dependent upon the same factors
as is a trial at law. White v. Chan Wy Sheung (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 270
Fed. 764; Moy Yoke Shue v. Johnson (1923, D. C. Mass.) 290 Fed. 621
(ordinary rules of evidence do not govern) ; Ex parte Lee Soo (1923, N. D.
Calif.) 291 Fed. 271 (decision may be against the weight of the testimony);
Chin See v. White (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 273 Fed. 801 (inclusion in the re-
cord on appeal of letters not produced at the hearing held not improper,
"since bad faith will not be imputed to an executive officer"); Heco FP k
Yuen v. White (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 273 Fed. 10 (proceedings based on
examination by one doctor held proper though the statute required the
examination to be by two doctors). By holding that the proceedings are
not criminal the defendant is deprived of his right to a jury trial. In ro
Chow Goo Pooi (1884, C. C. D. Calif.) 25 Fed. 77. This subordination of
legal form to efficiency of action, so long as substantial justice is done,
seems a salutary rule for an administrative body. Civil service commis-
sions follow a similar theory. Coolidge v. Bruce (1924, Mass.) 144 N. E.
397 (charges against officer not to be construed with strictness of an
indictment or complaint); Dickey v. Civil Service Commission (1925, Iowa)
205 N. W. 961 (substantial, not formal, compliance with statute deemed
sufficient). In justice, however, this simplification should be available in
favor of the defendant as well as in favor of the government. There is no
reason 'why formal defects in the defendant's case should be fatal to his
claim. The practice, however, is to the contrary. Ex Parte Cheung Sum
Shee (1924, D. C. Calif.) 2 Fed. (2d) 995 (alien wives refused habeas
corpus because of failure to get visas); United States ex. rel. Young v.
Stump (1923, D. C. Md.) 287 Fed. 192 (Chinese, though of admissible class,
refused admittance because of failure to procure required certificate in
advance); Yuen v. Johnson (1924, D. C. Mass.) 299 Fed. 604 (status of
Chinese merchants, subjects of Great Britain, held provable only by
certificates issued by British government). Administrative boards should
be allowed more freedom in their procedure than courts of law, but the
benefits of that freedom should be accorded to the individual as well as
the state.
ALIENS-IMMIGRATION-AMERICAN-BORN CHINESE WOMAN MARRYING
CHINESE CITIZEN NOT ADMITTED UPON TERMINATION OF MARITAL RELATION.
-The petitioner, a Chinese woman born in the United States, emigrated
to China and there married a Chinese citizen. After her husband's death
she sought to enter at an American port, but was denied admission under
the Immigration Act of 1924 (43 Stat. at L. 153) on the ground of
ineligibility to citizenship. Held, on habeas corpus proceedings, that, being
of an excluded race and by her marriage an alien, she was not eligible to
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admission. Ex parte (NG) Famg Sing (1925, W. D. Wash.) 6 Fed. (2d)
670.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment all persons born in the United States
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States.
Congress is without power to restrict the effect of birth. United States
v. Wong Kimn Ark (1898) 169 U. S. 649, 703, 13 Sup. Ct. 45G, 478. But
one may by his own voluntary act expatriate himself. Act of July 26,
1868 (15 Stat. at L. 223). Congress may validly provide that marriage
to an alien shall effect expatriation. Mackczzie v. Harc (1915) 239 U. S.
299, 36 Sup. Ct. 106. Under the existing law such is the effect of the
marriage of an American-born woman to an alien ineligible to citizenship.
Act of Sept. 22, 1922, sec. 3 (42 Stat. at L. 1022). Women so expatriating
themselves could formerly regain their American citizenship by returning
to the United States upon termination of the marital relation. Act of
Mlarch 2, 1907, sec. 3 (34 Stat. at L. 1228). Section 7 of the Act of 1922
repealed this provision. The petitioner contended that her power to resume
American citizenship under the Act of 1907 had vested and could not be
taken away by the Act of 1922. But grant of citizenship to aliens is "a
matter of favor and not of right". United States v. Gizsbcrg (1917) 243
U. S. 472, 37 Sup. Ct. 422; Petition of Connal (1925, E. D. N. Y.) 8 Fed.
(2d) 374. The present law apparently attempts to put such expatriated
women, seeking admission to the United States, as nearly as possible on the
same footing as other aliens. Section 13 (c) of the Act of 1921 provides
that no alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States.
Under Rev. Sts. sec. 2169, as enlarged by the Act of Feb. 18, 1875 (18
Stat. at L. 318) those eligible to citizenship are "free white perons, aliens
of African nativity, and persons of African descent." This bars the brown
and yellow races of Asia. Ozawa v. United States (1922) 200 U. S. 178,
43 Sup. Ct. 65; United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923) 261 U. S. 201,
43 Sup. Ct. 338. Thus the petitioner in the instant case was properly ex-
cluded. It may be thought that the result is unfortunate and that Con-
gress had no intention to deprive an American-born woman of her privilege
of resuming citizenship at the termination of the alien marriage. If so,
the statute should be amended. That contention is weakened, however, by
the fact that the law would not operate to exclude a white or negro woman
in the petitioner's position. Section 12 (a) of the Act of 1921 provides
that immigrants actually born in America who have lost their citizenship
shall be considered as having been born in the country of which they are
citizens. The President's proclamation of June 30, 1924, naming the quotas
for immigration, issued in pursuance of sec. 12 (c) of the Act of 1924,
declares a nominal quota of 100 for eligible aliens born in China. A white
or negro woman in the petitioner's position could, it seems, gain admission
under that quota and ultimately acquire citizenship by the usual courze.
Thus the petitioner was discriminated against by the law, even though
born in the United States, because of the race of her father and of her
husband. For a general discussion, see Parker, The "Ineligible to Citzcn-
ship" Provisions of the Immigration. Act of 1924 (1925) 19 Ai. Joun. INT.
LAw, 23.
BAN.Ks AND BANKING-COLLECTION ITEMS--BANx o0 DEpOSIu HEL To
HAvE PREFERRED CLA:I rOR AMaOUNT O' DIu-L SENT DnIEc To Dmtvn7r-
The plaintiff bank, payee of a draft drawn by one of its depositors, for-
warded the draft directly to the drawee bank. The drawee remitted as
payment its own draft on a third bank. Payment thereon was refused for
lack of funds. Thereafter the drawee bank failed. The lower court re-
fused to grant the plaintiff bank a preferred claim against the assets of
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the drawee. Held, on appeal, that judgment be reversed since the drawee
was an agent for collection and remittance, and held the proceeds in trust
for the plaintiff. Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (1925, Mo. App.)
275 S. W. 579.
Although it does not affirmatively so appear, the court treated the draft
in the instant case as restrictively endorsed "for collection and remittance".
A bank holds commercial paper so endorsed, when deposited for collection
purposes, as trustee. See Lippitt v. Thames Loan and Trust Co. (1914)
88 Conn. 185, 202, 90 Atl. 369, 375; Scott, Cases on the Law of Trusts
(1919) 64, note. But it is usually held that the relation of debtor and cred-
itor arises upon actual collection. See Hecker etc. Milling Co. v. Cosmopol-
itan Trust Co. (1922) 242 Mass. 181, 185, 136 N. E. 333, 334, 24 A. L. R,
1148, 1150 (with note). Where, however, the bank collects after its known
insolvency, it holds the proceeds under a constructive trust. Lippitt v.
Thames Loan and Trust Co., supra; Clark Sparks & Sons v). American Nat.
Bank (1916, S. D. Ga.) 230 Fed. 738. The present case follows a prevalent
view that the collecting bank is also trustee of the proceeds if it has been
specifically directed to remit to the principal. Murray v. North Liberty
Savings Bank (1923) 196 Iowa, 729, 195 N. W. 354; People v. Ivka State
Bank (1923) 229 Ill. App. 4; State Bank v. First Bank (1916) 124 Ark.
531, 187 S. W. 673. But the common banking practice is to mingle col-
lection proceeds with general funds, despite endorsements for remittance.
See Lippitt v. Thames Loan and Trust Co., supra, at 204, 90 Atl. at 376;
see Hecker etc. Mill. Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., supra, at 186, 136 N.
E. at 335; see also NOTE (1922) 21 A. L. R. 680, 681. The inference would
seem to be, therefore, that in banking circles such endorsements are not
understood as forbidding mingling. See Freeman's Nat. Bank v. National
,Tube Wks. (1890) 151 Mass. 413, 418, 24 N. E. 779; Scott, op. cit. at 68,
note; see also Stone, Some Legal Problems in the Transmitting of Funds
(1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 507, 514. Since both endorser and endorsee are
members of the banking profession, words used should have only the
meaning understood in that profession. Stone, op. cit. at 509. In the
present case, such an interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the
plaintiff bank actually accepted a draft in remittance. See Union Nat.
Bank v. Citizens Bank (1899) 153 Ind. 44, 53, 54 N. E. 97, 100; of. Saylvs
v. Cox (1895) 95 Tenn. 579, 583, 32 S. W. 626, 627. But if the privilege
to mingle exists, no specific res for the so-called trust can be found. Smith
& Co. v. Montgomery (1923) 209 Ala. 100, 95 So. 290; Commonwealth v.
Tradesmen's Trust Co. (1915) 250 Pa. 378, 95 Atl. 577. Many courts, in
holding that a trust exists, gloss over this difficulty. See Spokane and
Eastern Trust Co. v. United States, Steel Prod. Co. (1923, C. C. A. 9th)
290 Fed. 884; Holder v. Western German Bank (1905, C. C. A. 6th) 136
Fed. 90; State Bank v. First Bank, supra. Some courts make the whole
banking fraternity habitually and consciously guilty of breach of trust
by declaring explicitly that the mingling was wrongful. Plano Mfg. Co.
v. Auld (1901) 14 S. D. 512, 86 N. W. 21; First Nat. Bank v. Dennis (1915)
20 N. M. 96, 146 Pac. 948; of. Hecker etc., Mill. Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust
Co., supra, at 186, 136 N. E. at 335. Other courts hold, and more soundly,
it is submitted, that because of the custom of mingling, only a debtor-
creditor relation exists. Central Trust Co, v. Hanover Trust Co. (1922)
242 Mass. 265, 136 N. E. 336; United States Nat. Bank v. Glanton (1917)
146 Ga. 786, 92 S. E. 625; Gonyer v. Williams (1914) 168 Calif. 452, 143
Pac. 736; see also NOTEs (1923) 72 U. PA. L. REV. 56. But it seems im-
possible to regard a drawee as an agent to collect from itself. A more
realistic view would be that in such a case the draft was sent not for
collection but for payment. People v. Merchants and Mechanics Bank of
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Troy (1879) 78 N. Y. 269; Idig '. N'ational City Ban: (1880) 80 X. Y.
100. For the transaction by mail is substantially equivalent to a presenta-
tion over the counter. People v. Merchants and Mechanics- Beal: of Troy,
supra, at 273. On such a construction the claim of the forwarding banIk
in the instant case would be for the return of the original instrument
from the drawee as bailee, unless it preferred to prove its claim on the
second instrument; but in neither event would the plaintiff have a preferred
claim against the defendant.
CARIERs-REsPoisIBrTY CONTINUTES WE= GOODS DAzGE- n; Trn.;SlT
ARE R -RN.ED TO SHIPPER FOR REPmni.-Goods, damaged in transit, vero
returned by the carrier to the shipper (apparently still the owner) under
an agreement whereby the shipper was to recondition the goods and re-
deliver to the carrier to enable the latter to complete the contract of
carriage. By the agreement, the shipper expressly reserved the privilege
of substituting other like articles for the identical ones returned to him.
The bill of lading was not surrendered. After reconditioning, the shipper
tendered delivery of the identical goods which the carrier refused because
his warehouse was filled to capacity. Subsequently the goods, w~hile still
in the shipper's warehouse, were destroyed by fire. The shipper sued
the carrier for the value of the goods. From a general verdict and judg-
ment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. Held, (two judges di,-
senting) that the judgment be affirmed, since the contract of carriage con-
tinued in force, and constructive possession of the goods was still in the
carrier. Cvrtis Tire Co. z. Goodrich Transit Co. (1925) 230 Mien. 593,
203 N. W. 522.
The extraordinary responsibility of a common carrier under a contract
of carriage arises upon the delivery of the goods with the full relinquish-
ment of control by the shipper. Barron v. Eldredgc (186S) 100 Macs. 455.
If an agent of the shipper is in charge of the goods, responsibility extends
only to losses caused by the carrier's negligence. Evans v. Rudy (1879)
34 Ark. 383. The heavier responsibility, once begun, continues until com-
pletion of the contract of carriage. Yazoo & . V. R. R. v. Ban (1912)
102 Bliss. 303, 59 So. 92. Or until the exercise by the owner (consignor
or consignee as the case may be) of his power of terminating the bailment
upon which the contract of carriage rests. Ryan v. Great Northern Ry.
(1903) 90 Blinn. 12, 95 N. W. 758. The owner can, of course, exercise
this power only if the carrier's lien for charges is discharged. Western
Transportation Co. v. Barber (1874) 56 N. Y. 544; 2 Hutchinson, Car-
riers (3d ed. 1906) sec. 864. A retaking by the owner, even for a temporary
purpose, if he takes in the capacity of owner, will suspend the carrier's
responsibility until a rebailment to him. Barron v. Mobile & Ohio Ry.
(1911) 2 Ala. App. 555, 56 So. 862. But the carrier's responsibility con-
tinues, if, during the course of shipment, he delivers the goods to his own
bailee or agent, though with the consent of the owner. D'Utvassy v. Sozth-
era Pac. Co. (1916, 1st Dept.) 174 App. Div. 547, 101 N. Y. Supp. 222.
The instant case raises the question whether the owner can ret-ahe his ovn
goods as bailee of the carrier so as to preserve the carrier's responsibility.
That an owner can become sub-bailee of his own goods has been recog-
nized. Widte v. Webb (1842) 15 Conn. 302; Roberts v. Wyatt (1810, C. P.)
2 Taunt. 268; Benjarin v. Strcmplc (1851) 13 IIl. 467. But on the facts
of the instant case it does not appear that the shipper (owner) too: the
goods as bailee of the carrier. In all bailments the identical goods must
be redelivered. Farqu'har v. McAlczy (1891) 142 Pa. 233, 240, 21 At].
811, 812; Wetherell v. O'Brien (1892) 140 Ill. 146, 150, 29 N. E. 001;
Powder Co. v. Burkhardt (1877) 97 U. S. 110. When the person receiving
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the goods has the privilege of returning either the same goods or other
goods of the same kind, the obligation is in the nature of a debt payable
in kind. Story, Bailments (8th ed. 1870) sec. 439. With reference to
the goods received he has all the rights of ownership. Sturm v. Boker
(1893) 150 U. S. 312, 329, 14 Sup. Ct. 99; Lonergan v. Stewart (1870)
55 Ill. 44. Such being the situation in the instant case, it would seem
that the shipper took as owner and, as the dissent insisted, that the case
could have been decided in favor of the defendant as a question of law.
Moreover, as a matter of policy, the instant decision seems to go too far
in holding the carrier for the loss of goods not in its custody and, in the
light of the shipper's privilege of substitution, not even appropriated to
the contract of carriage.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CRIMINAL STATUTES-INDEFINITENESS OF TERm,
"CURRENT RATE OF WAGES PER DIEM IN THE LOCALITY" AS WANT OF DUE
PROCESs.-The General Construction Company sued to enjoin the Commis.
sioner of Labor from enforcing a penal statute providing an eight-hour
day for persons employed by or on behalf of the state and for payment of
"not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality". A
fine of not less than $50 or more than $500 a day, or imprisonment for not
less than three or more than six months was imposed for its violation.
From a decree for the plaintiff the defendant appealed. Held, (Justices
Holmes and Brandeis concurring in result) that the decree be affirmed on
the ground that the terms "current rate" and "locality" are too indefinite.
Connally v. General Const. Co. (1925, U. S.) 46 Sup. Ct. 126.
Too great "indefiniteness" will cause a criminal statute to be declared
unconstitutional, on the ground that the criminality cannot be determined
ex post facto by a jury without denying due process of' law. Tozer v.
United States (1892, C.C.E.D.Mo.) 52 Fed. 917; (1923) 32 YALE LAw Jova-
NAL, 291. Quite naturally the courts differ in their interpretation of the
same terms. Thus "unjust and unreasonable charge" has been held both
definite and indefinite. United States v. Russel (1920, E.D.La.) 265 Fed.
414 (held definite); Small v. American Sugar Ref. Co. (1925) 267 U. S.
233, 45 Sup. Ct. 295 (held indefinite). Likewise the phrase, "speed greater
than is reasonable". Mulkern v. State (1922) 176 Wis. 490, 187 N.W. 190
(held definite); Hayes v. State (1912) 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S.E. 523 (held
indefinite). Nevertheless, there are guides to the framing of a constitu-
tional statute. Thus if a statute is merely declaratory of the common law,
it is usually held sufficiently definite. State v. Lawrence (1913) 9 Okla.
Cr. 16, 130 Pac. 508 ("grossly disturbs the public peace"); State v. Dixon
(1917) 138 Tenn. 195, 196 S.W. 486 ("without good cause . . . fail
to provide for his wife"); Keefer v. State (1910) 174 Ind. 588, 92 N.E,
656 ("maintain any public nuisance"). But the illusory nature of this
test from the point of view of the offender is well illustrated by the case
of Pitcher v. People (1867) 16 Mich. 142, where the court was troubled by
the meaning of common law "robbery". On the other hand, the courts
follow the general rule that a greater definiteness will be required where
the penalty is severe. See United States v. Pennsylvania By. (1916) 242
U. S. 208, 237, 37 Sup. Ct. 95, 105, ("normal requirements" too indefinite in
view of $5000 per day penalty). Much of the uncertainty, however, can'
be avoided by the legislature's designating an executive officer or a com-
mission to give content to an "indefinite" term-e.g., to declare the "current
rate" for the "locality". Chicago & N.W. By. v. Dey (1888, C.C.S.D. Iowa)
35 Fed. 866; cf. Buttfield v. Stranahan (1904) 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct.
349. In the instant case, however, this would in effect entail the creation
of a wage regulation board, which might be considered undesirable. It is
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not surprising that the Supreme Court was divided since similar statute3
have been considered "definite" by state courts. Ryan ,. City of Xcv
York (1904) 177 N. Y. 271, 69 N.E. 599 ("prevailing rate" and "locality") ;
State v. Tibbetts (1922, Okla. Cr.) 205 Pac. 77G ("current rate" and "lo-
cality").
CONTF.cs--ILLuSORY CONTRATS-CONSID TION UNAFFECTED BY S"ixr-
tILATION Fon SATISFACTION IN COmmIERCLL SFRnViCr CONTfCT.-The plain-
tiff, a jobber, and the defendant, a manufacturer, entered into an agree-
ment for the marketing of the defendant's product. The plaintiff promised
to carry a stock thereo . sufficient to supply its trade requirements, to cotp-
erate in and to promote their sale, and in all respects to perform to the
satisfaction of the defendant. The defendant's sole promise in return was
for "sales co6peration". The contract also accorded to the defendant the
power to cancel the agreement and all unfilled orders without notice, if the
plaintiff failed to perform to the defendant's satisfaction. Asserting that
its relation with the plaintiff could no longer be "amicable and coEpera-
tive", the defendant terminated the agreement and refused to ship orders
already on hand. For this refusal the plaintiff brought this action. The
lower court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that no con-
tract was shown. The plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment be re-
versed since a binding contract was shown; that the consideration for the
plaintiff's promises was to be found in the defendant's implied undertaling
to fill orders on the terms specified in the contract; and that the power of
cancellaton did not invalidate the consideration, since the power was con-
ditional upon honest dissatisfaction. Mills-Mori. Co. v. CIhiion Spar:
Plug Co. (1925, C. C. A. 6th) 7 Fed. (2d) 38.
The implying of the undertaking of the defendant in the instant ea:e
is in accordance with the well settled rule where all the other terms of a
contract are set out and the technical promise alone is laclng. Ekrc 4 !-
worth v. St doner & Co. (1920) 229 N. Y. 210, 123 N. E. 103. The que-
tion remains, however, whether the power of the defendant to cancel upon
dissatisfaction renders his promise illusory. When one party contracts
to perform to the satisfaction of the other, if adequacy of performance is
dependent on taste or on judgment upon matters peculiarly within the
knowledge of the promisee, the promisee is the sole judge of satisfaction.
Zaleski -e. Clark (1876) 44 Conn. 21S (sculptor to make a bust). But
where questions of common kmowledge only are involved, such as mechani-
cal fitness or commercial value, the promisee must be reasonable in his
dissatisfaction. Boiler Co. v. Gardizcr (1s86) 101 N. Y. 337, 4 N. E. 749
(repair of boiler). In either class of cases the dissatisfaction must be
genuine and expressed in good faith. Dkmwzd -. MezdclsoIn (1913, 1st
Dept.) 156 App. Div. 636, 141 N. Y. Supp. 775. Where, as in the instant
case, an employment contract contains a power of cancellation conditional
upon "personal" dissatisfaction, the condition is generally enforced literally.
Kramer v. Wien (1915, 1st Dept.) 92 Mlisc. 159, 155 N. Y. Supp. 193
(traveling salesman agreeing to perform "to the entire personal satisfac-
tion" of the employer). Contra, where the undertaking is to perform "in a
satisfactory manner". Ha,za ford ,. Stevens (1910) 39 R. 1. 182, 93 Atl.
209 (traveling salesman). The reason for literal enforcement, as stated
in a case involving a sales agency contract, is that proof of the reasonable-
ness of dissatisfaction as to such personal qualities of the agent as
"efficiency, initiative, and business experience" is next to impossible. Ikbell
v. Anderson Carriage Co. (1912) 170 Mich. 304, 313, 13G N. W. 457, 460.
Such literal enforcement, however, does not leave the defendant's perform-
ance dependent on his mere whim, since unless actually dissatisfied, he ia
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bound to perform whatever duties he has undertaken. Bridges v. Homoe
Guano Co. (1924) 33 Ga. App. 305, 125 S. E. 872. This condition preced-
ent to cancellation is a sufficient limitation on his freedom of action to
provide the necessary mutuality of consideration in the contract. Hogue-
Kellogg Co. v. Baker (1920) 47 Calif. App. 247, 190 Pac. 493; Casinghcad
Gas Co. v. Osborn (1921) 269 Pa. 395, 112 Atl. 469. This was the only
question before the appellate court, and whether the facts showed actual
dissatisfaction on the defendant's part would remain to be determined
upon a new trial. Contractual obligation may seem in cases such as the
present to be near the vanishing point; but the frequency of such contracts
attests their commercial usefulness; and since they are within the techni-
cal requirements of consideration, they should undoubtedly be upheld. Cf.
Casinghead Gas Co. v. Osborn, supra.
CONTRACTS--STIPULATION AGAINST EFFECT OF FRAUD HELD INOPERATiVE.-
The defendant,, knowing the sub-surface conditions to be other than as
represented by drawings given out as a basis for bids for a sewer con-
struction, appended a note to the contract in effect denying responsibility for
such representations. On discovering the true conditions, the plaintiff,
within a reasonable time, rescinded on the grund of fraud and obtained a
judgment for the cost of labor performed and materials furnished. H1cld,
that the judgment be affirmed since the provision in the contract was in-
operative to deprive the plaintiff of any claim against the defendant for
conscious misrepresentations. Passaic Valley Sewerage Com'rs v. Hol-
brook, C. & R. Corp. (1925, C. C. A. 3d) 6 Fed. (2d) 721.
A stipulation in a contract disclaiming responsibility for misrepresenta-
tions of the disclaiming party himself is no defense to an action of deceit
based on such misrepresentations. Pearson v. Dublin [1907, H. L.J A. 0.
351. Or to a suit for rescission. United States v. Atlantic Dredging Co.
(1920) 253 U. S. 1, 40 Sup. Ct. 423 (construction contract); Bent v.
Furnald (1911) 159 Ill. App. 552 (sale of personal property); Jordon v.
Nelson (1920, Iowa) 178 N. W. 544 (sale of real property). And an ex-
press warranty by a seller himself excluding any other warranties will not
destroy the buyer's power of rescission for fraudulent misrepresentations
by the seller's agent. Jones v. Minks (1914) 188 Ill. App. 45; see (1921)
10 A. L. R. 1472, note. The general rule is, however, qualified in the case
of insurance contracts in that provisions making policies incontestable for
misrepresentations by the insured are generally upheld if they allow to
the insurer an interval after issue during which he can contest for fraud.
Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford (1923) 161 Ark. 602, 257 S. W.
66. At least one court has upheld such a provision even in the absence
of such interval of contestability. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Fox (1901)
106 Tenn. 347, 61 S.. W. 62; contra: Reagan v. Union Mt. Ins. Co.
(1905) 189 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217. But insurance contracts in this, as in
many other respects, are probably exceptional. The decision in the instant
case seems sound in following the rule uniformly applied in other than
insurance cases; for it ought not to be possible to make conscious nis-
representations and then contract out of responsibility for harm resulting
from the other party's reliance thereon. The honest course in such circum-
stances is to refrain from making any representations at all or, having
made them, to disclose their falsity. And although the plaintiff be care-
less in his reliance, as between fraud and negligence, the law should
penalize the former. Wilcox v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (1903) 176 N. Y.
115, 68 N. E. 153; Warder, Bushnell & Glassner Co. v. Whitish (1890) 77
Wis. 430, 46 N. W. 540.
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CONTRACTS-INTERPRETATION OF TER is--ADIISSBILiTY oF EviNmCe OF
TRADE USAGE-NECESSITY OF PLEADING TrLxDE USAGE.-The plaintiff con-
tracted to sell goods---"delivery June, July, August". A part was shipped
and paid for in May, but the remainder was not shipped until September
4th, after the defendant had cancelled the remainder of the order on the
ground that delivery was overdue. In this action brought upon the de-
fendant's refusal to receive the goods, the defendant, without pleading
the usage, was permitted to show that in the trade in which the parties
were engaged "delivery June, July, August" meant in about equal install-
ments in each of those months. The plaintiff's request for an adjourn-
ment to obtain evidence in rebuttal was denied. Judgment was for the
defendant. Held, upon appeal (two judges disscating) that the judgment
be reversed, since the requested adjournment should have been granted.
Two of the judges put the reversal on the additional ground that evi-
dence of the trade usage was inadmissible since the meaning of the phrase
in question was fixed as a matter of law by five previous decisions. Cliftwi
Shirtihng Co. v. Bromne Shirt Co. (1925, App. Div. 1st Dept.) 209 N. Y.
Supp. 709.
Words in a contract are to be interpreted with regard to the circum-
stances in which they were. uttered. Batcheldcr v. Batchelder (1914) 220
Mass. 42, 107 N. E. 455; 2 Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 618; Holmes,
Theory of Legal Interpretation (1899) 12 RLurn. L. REv. 417. When the
words can be ascribed to one of the parties they are to be given the mean-
ing that would be put on them by a reasonably intelligent man in the
position of the party addressed. Rickcrson v. Hartford Fbc Ir. Co.
(1896) 149 N. Y. 307, 43 N. E. 856; 2 Williston, op. cit. see. G03. Other-
wise the standard is that of a reasonably intelligent man in the circurm-
stances common to both parties. 2 Williston, op. cit. see. G07. Ienber-
ship in a trade or other vocation is but one of the circumstances to be
considered. See Kauffmzan v. Raedcr (1901, C. C. A. 8th) 10S Fed. 171, 135;
Inteimational Finance Corp. v'. Calvert Drug Co. (1924) 144 Md. 003, 312,
124 Atl. 891, 894. Likewise private understandings between the parties
as to the meaning of words used. Lehigh etc. Coal Co. v. Wright (1896)
177 Pa. 387, 35 Atl. 919. But in some situations, to prevent fraud,
such private understandings are excluded from consideration by the parol
evidence rule. Hebberd v,. Metal Lath Co. (1914, App. Div. 1st Dept.) 150
N. Y. Supp. 72; 2 Williston, op. cit. sees. 631--33, 038, 630. But proof of
membership in a trade or profession is always admissible. Miller v. Gcr-
vain Seed & Plant Co. (1924) 193 Calif. 02, 222 Pac. 817. Parties are
presumed to contract with reference to established usages of the trade in
which they are both engaged and such usages, because of their notorious
character, can be shown without danger of fraud. Union Ina. Co. r. AmcH-
caa Fire Ins. Co. (1895) 107 Calif. 327, 40 Pac. 431. They will be ecluded
from consideration in interpreting the terms of the contract only where
the writing itself clearly shows the intent of the parties to exclude then.
Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal Co. (1920, C. C. A. 2d) 269 Fed. 963; (1921) 30
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 761; COmNTS (1923) 33 Ibid. 172; 2 Williston, op.
cit. sees. 650, 656. The usage may be proved even though the ru!e of law
applicable to the case be different when the usage is shown. Bariic v.
Quinby (1910) 206 Mass. 259, 92 N. E. 451; 2 Williston, op. cit. sec. 651,
653. Contra, if the contract with the usage embodied would be unen-
forceable for illegality. Franklin Sugar Rcfizing Co. v. Komc Milffig Co.
(1923) 278 Pa. 105, 122 AtL. 231; 2 Williston, op. cit. sees. 655. Only a few
phrases have a meaning fixed by law. Thus in a deed, "to A and his
heirs" is given such a fixed meaning, due to the need of certainty as to
estates created as evidence in public land records or title deeds. CarIce
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v. Ellsberry (1907) 82 Ark. 209, 101 S. W. 407. And so with the phrase
"pay to A or order" when used in commercial paper, since a label is
needed that will divulge at a glance the negotiable character of the instru-
ment. Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat. Bank (1919) 67 Colo.
6, 185 Pac. 260. In such cases proof of a contrary trade usage would be
inadmissible. But similar reasons for fixity of meaning do not exist in
the case of ordinary contracts; and to construe words therein in a fixed
sense seems like a return to the days of "strict law". Wigmore, Evidenco
(2d ed. 1923) sec. 2461. If the parties are chargeable with notice of valid
usages when contracting, it would seem that they should be chargeable with
notice thereof at trial -without specially pleading them. Warren v. Lebarn
Mill & Timber Co. (1924) 129 Wash. 565, 225 Pac. 628; McDonald v. Uniolt
Hay Co. (1919) 143 Minn. 40, 17Z N. W. 891; contra: Palmer v. Humiston
(1913) 87 Ohio St. 401, 101 N. E. 283. And even if the facts of the
instant case disclose a variance it would still seem that the trial court
was within its discretionary power in determining that the plaintiff was
not, in the particular case, taken by surprise. N.Y. C.P.A. 1921, sec. 434;
Rules, C. P. 166.
CORPORTIONs--TRUSTs--DEPOSIT OF FUNDS ;O MEET INTEREST PAYMENT
ON BONDS HELD TO CREATE A TRUST FOR COUPON HoLDER.-The receivers
of the defendant company obtained an order directing the Central Union
Trust Company, as fiscal agent of the defendant, to pay over to the receiv-
ers certain moneys deposited by the defendant with the trust company to
be paid by it to the holders of interest coupons from defendant's bonds
upon presentation of such coupons to the depositary by the holders. The
trust company was trustee under the original indenture which provided
that "any moneys at any time deposited with the trustee . . . for the
payment of interest" on the bonds should be held by the trustee in trust for
the coupon holders. On the other hand, the indenture provided that the
defendant should receive interest on such moneys as on a general deposit.
It also specifically excepted "current assets", defined to include "cash in
bank", from the lien conferred by the indenture. The defendant by the
terms of the bonds promised to pay interest thereon "at its office or agency
in the borough of Manhattan". The appointment of the trust company as
defendant's fiscal agent was subsequent to the indenture. Defendant's
vouchers covering the deposits in question were directed to the trust com-
pany, "trustee". Held, on appeal, that the above order be reversed since
the trust company held the funds us trustee and not as fiscal agent. Steel
Cities Chemical Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. (1925, C. C. A. 2d)
7 Fed. (2d) 280.
The relation between a corporation and its bondholders is that of debtor
and creditor, both as to principal and interest. The status of the bond-
holder is not raised to that of cestui que trust by a mere deposit of funds
by the corporation for the purpose of paying the bondholders. In re Inter-
borough Cons. -Corp. (1923, C. C. A. 2d) 288 Fed. 334; 32 A. L. R. 932;
Noyes v. First Nat. Bank (1917) 180 App. Div. 162, 167 N. Y. Supp. 288,
aff'd (1918) 224 N. Y. 542, 120 N. E. 870. In the case of stockholders,
however, a like deposit for the purpose of paying declared dividends will
constitute a trust in which the corporation holds its claim against the de-
positary in trust for the stockholders. In re Interborough Cons. Corp.
(1920, S. D. N. Y.) 267 Fed. 914; Guidise v. Island Ref. Corp. (1923, S. D.
N. Y.) 291 Fed. 922. Yet the declaration of dividends alone creates with
respect to such dividends a debtor-creditor relation only. Lowne v. Ameri-
can Fire Ins. Co. (1837, N. Y.) 6 Paige Ch. 482; Hunt v. O'Shea (1899)
69 N. 11. 600, 45 Atl. 480. The distinction between the two situations seems
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without reason. See Guidise v. Islau d Refining Co., supra; Grinnell, Status
of Fvwzus Deposited for Paymnent of Interest on Boads (1925) 19 ILL
L. REv. 429. The two rules apparently grew up disjunctly. The "divi-
dends rule" goes back to LeRoy v. Globe Ins. Co. (1836, N. Y.) 2 Edw. Ch.
656. The "coupon rule" was first announced in Statcn Island Club v. Farn-
er's L. & T. Co. (1899, 2d Dept) 41 App. Div. 321, 58 N. Y. Supp. 40. That
case held that the corporation might lawfully reclaim the deposit before
actual disbursement since no trust was created by virtue of the deposit in
favor of coupon holders and since, further, the coupon holders acquired
thereby no rights in the deposited funds under the doctrine of Lawrc nc V.
Fox (1859) 20 N. Y. 268. The Staten Island case has been followed in
numerous later New York decisions, both state and federal. Elsewhere
the question has apparently not arisen-probably because nearly all bond
issues are made payable in New York City. Of course, the usual rule may
be altered where there is a clear expression of intention by the depositor
that the deposit shall constitute an irrevocable appropriation for the pay-
ment of the coupons. Roger's Locomotire Works v. Kelly (1882) 88 N. Y.
234. It is on this ground that the instant decision is put, But the provi-
sion for interest, -if the original indenture is to be relied on to establish
the trust, is clearly indicative of a privilege in the depositary of using the
funds in question; and such a privilege is inconsistent with its holding the
funds as trustee. See Pittsburgh Nat. Bank of Conz. v. 1Meurray (1381)
98 Pa. 538, 540; Ex parte Broad [1884, C. A.] L. R. 13 Q. B. Div. 7,10, 7,16.
If a trust arose-and the court so held-then the defendant was the trustee
and the trust res was its claim against the trust company which it held
for the benefit of the coupon holder. This must be understood as the sub-
stance of the instant decision. See In re Interborough Cons. Corp. (1920)
267 Fed. 914, 919. The instant case differs on its facts from that case in the
provisions of the indenture, in the form of the voucher, and in the method
of direct payment by the trust company to the coupon holders. But the
method of payment, although relied on in part in the majority opinion, was,
as pointed out by the dissent, only a bookkeeping arrangement, valueless
by itself as evidence of a trust intent; and though the indenture provided
that moneys deposited with the trustee should constitute a trust for the
coupon holders, it also specifically exempted money in the bank: from the
lien given by the indenture. Therefore, in view of the dual role of the
trust company, the language of the indenture can be relied on to spell out
the trust only if the deposit was made with the trust company es trustee
rather than in its other capacity as fiscal agent. The only evidence that
the deposit was so made is the appellation, "trustee", in the voucher. The
ground of distinction, therefore, seems rather tenuous; but the result is
desirable and its achievement on so slight a ground may indicate the be-
ginning of judicial attrition of the seemingly groundless distinction between
deposits to pay dividends declared and deposits to pay interest coupons.
DOZMICILF-VOTING PRIvILEME OF STUDENTS--UNDEn Nmv YoK CoNz-
STITUTION.-Several self-supporting students in a theological seminary at
H, having severed by oath to the Catholic Church all connections with
former residences and having formally abandoned their voting privileges
there, petitioned to be registered as voters in H. The lower court granted
the petition, finding them domiciled in H for voting purposes. Held, on
appeal, that in view of the New York Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3, stating
that for the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained
a residence by reason of his presence while a student in an educational
institution, the decree be reversed. In re Blank ford (1925) 241 N. Y. 180,
149 N. E. 415.
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English courts insist upon a definite intention to remain permanently as
a condition of acquiring domicile. Bell v. Kennedy [1868] L. R. 1 H. L.,
Sc. 307. Most American courts, however, have defined domicile as re-
quiring an intention to remain for an indefinite period. Putnam V. John.
"son (1813) 10 Mass. 488, 501. In some instances a residence for a definite
period, as for the completion of a college course, has been deemed sufficient
to establish domicile for voting purposes. Pedigo v. Grimes (1887) 113
Ind. 148, 13 N. E. 700; Welsh v. Shumway (1907) 232 Ill. 54, 83 N. E.
549; McCrary, Elections (4th ed. 1897) sec. 98, note 5. All that these
courts require is an intention to adopt the present place of abode as a
residence, to the exclusion of all other places, even for a definite and
determinable period. Pedigo v. Grimes, supra, at 153-154; In re Lower
Merion Election (1878, Pa.) 1 Chester Co. Rep. 257, 258. A student re-
taining connections with his former residence does not, however, acquire
a domicile for voting purposes in a university town. Siebold v. Wahl
(1916) 164 Wis. 82, 159 N. W. 546; see also In re Rice (1875, N.Y.C.P.)
7 Daly, 22 (naturalization domicile). But where he has definitely
severed these ties, becoming self-supporting and independent, with no
intention of returning during vacations or when ill, and is living at the
school for the period required to complete his course, intending to be a
resident there, he acquires at common law a domicile for voting purposes,
even though present or a definite and determinable period. Berry V.
Wilcox (1895) 44 Neb. 82, 62 N. W. 249; Welsh v. Shumway, supra.
Twenty-two states have constitutional or statutory provisions to the ef-
fect that "for the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have
gained or lost a residence, by reason of his presence or absence
while a student of any seminary of learning". E.g., N. Y. Const., art. 2,
sec. 3; N. Y. Laws, 1922, ch. 588, sec. 151. See Jacobs, Law of Domicil
(1887) sec. 339, and note, for citation of many constitutional provisions.
The word "residence" appearing in constitutions and statutes, especially
in those regulating voting, is universally conceded to mean domicile.
McCrary, supra, at secs. 97, 98; '(1926) 35 YALn LAw JOURNAL, 508. Al-
though these enactments have been construed to change the common-law
requirement for voting domicile (see People v. Osborn (1912) 170 Mich.
143, 135 N. W. 921) they seem to be directed in general, as is the common-
law rule, against students present merely to study and retaining connec-
tions with former residences. They are to prevent mere presence as
students from conferring a voting domicile and are, in effect, merely
declaratory of the generally recognized common-law rule. In re Lower
Merion Election, supra (identical constitutional provision with New
York); Stewart v. Kyser (1895) 105 Calif. 459, 39 Pac. 19 (identical
constitutional provision); Hall v. Schoenecke (1895) 128 Mo. 661, 31
S. W. 97 (identical constitutional provision); Matter of Cunningham
(1904, Clinton Co. N. Y.) 45 Misc. 206; Jacobs, loc. cit. supra. This was
pointed out in the lower New York court decision of In re Ward (1892,
Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 20 N. Y. Supp. 606, and was implied in In re Garv'ey
(1895) 147 N. Y. 117, 41 N. E. 439 (Barry's Case). For a history of the
real meaning of these constitutional provisions see Lower Oxford Con-
tested Election (1878, Pa.) 1 Chester Co. Rep. 253, 254 and In re Ward,
supra, at 610, 611; but see People v. Osbarn, supra. The court in the
instant case should, thdrefore, have applied the common-law rule, under
which it might have been held that a voting domicile was acquired. Cf.
In Re Garvey, supra. In situations somewhat similar to those of stu-
dents, soldiers, who are also included in the constitutional provisions, are
not precluded from acquiring a voting domicile where they have a definite
intention to become residents. In re Cunningham, supra. And also for
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purposes of probating a will, a soldier is allowed a domicile. Ane3 v'.
Duryea (1871, N. Y. Sup. Ct. 4th Dept.) G Lansing, 155.
INSUI NcE-PRooFs OF Loss REQUIRED WITHIN STATED PERIOD Elm!,
Ar-TF_ WRONGFUL CANCELLATION OF POLICY BY CO:,PANY.-The defendant
insurance company issued a policy of fire insurance payable, firzt, to the
mortgagee, second, to the mortgagors. Later the mortgagee obtainel a
cancellation of the policy, the mortgagors being informed of this cancella-
tion by the defendant's local agent after the destruction of the insured
building. To a suit on the policy by the mortgagor:, failure to furnish
proofs of loss was raised as a defense. The plaintiffs contended that the
defendant's cancellation operated as a waiver thereof. The lower court
directed a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. Held,
(three judges dissenting) that the judgment be reverzed since, the agent
having no authority to cancel the policy, there was no waiver of the proofs
of loss. Gainbino v. Northern Insurancc Co. of X. Y. 11925, Mich.) 205
N. W. 480.
The courts usually deal with the problem of the instant case as one of
waiver. Fisk v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia (1916) 192 Mich. 243, 153 N. W.
947. These cases, however, actually involve the application of the well
settled rule of insurance and contract law that repudiation by one party ex-
cuses fulfillment of conditions precedent by the other-in the instant eaze the
furnishing of proofs of loss. See Vance, Waier and Estoppel in Inmarence
Law (1925) 34 YAI.U LAW JOURN.L, 834, 849. Where there has been a re-
pudiation, the rule has sometimes been stated that waiver of proofs of lo
need not be in writing since non-waiver stipulations of the policy apply only
to conditions to be performed prior to the destruction 'of the property.
Indian River State Bank v,. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1903) 46 Fla. 23, '5
So. 228 (repudiation by agent); Improved Match Co. v. Michigan M't . F'e
Ins. Co. (1899) 122 Mich. 256, 80 N. W. 1083 (repudiation by company).
In fact, however, it is the repudiation that has made such performanoe
unnecessary. The real question, clearly indicated by the dissenting judges
in the instant case, is whether there has been such an overt act by the
company as amounts to repudiation. It is generally held that an act of
cancellation amounts to a repudiation. Pauley v. Sun Ins. Office 1910)
79 W. Va. 187, 90 S. E. 552. That it was such in the instant ca-e 2eems
clear since the defendant later defended on the ground of such cancella-
tion. There is some doubt as to the necessity of notice of repudiation to
the insured. Possibly none is necessary; but there is authority to the
effect that the notice must be communicated. Anson, Cotracts (Corbin's
ed. 1919) 444. But where notice has been received, it would seem that,
where there has been such an overt act by one party as the cancellation
of the policy, the other party should be excused from further performance,
regardless of the manner of communication. Thus notice of repudiation
given to a third party is sufficient if it comes to the knovledge of the
insured. Merchants Ins. Co. v. No:lin (1900, Tex. Civ. App.) 56 S. W. 193.
Consequently the dissenting view seems the sounder, since the question
being actually one of repudiation rather than waiver, the lach of authority
to waive in the agent is immaterial.
JUDGMENTS-FEDERAL COURTS-TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF JUDGMENT LIEN.
-The Act of Aug. 1, 1SS8 (25 Stat. at L. 357) provides that feleral
judgments rendered within any state shall be liens on the debtor's prop-
erty "throughout such state in the same manner and to the same extent
and under the same conditions only as if such judgments and decrees had
been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction of such state". The provi-
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sion is applicable, however, only in such states as authorize the filing of
federal judgments in the same manner as judgments "of the courts of
the state". The Missouri statute (Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, ch. 12, secs. 1554-6)
provides that federal judgments shall be liens in any county upon the
filing of a transcript of the judgment in the state circuit court of that
county, but makes judgments rendered by any court of record liens in the
county for which the court is held without the filing of a transcript. A
judgment was rendered against W by the federal district court at Joplin,
Jasper County. No transcript 'was filed in the state circuit court for
that county-the only state court of general jurisdiction. W then sold
land in Jasper County to the defendant and the defendant took possession.
Under execution subsequently issued on the federal judgment the land was
sold to the plaintiff. In a suit for possession the court gave judgment for
the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. Held, (tvo judges di.senting)
that the judgment be affirmed, since the federal district court was held not
for, but in, Jasper County' and the filing of a transcript of its judgment
was therefore a condition precedent to a lien in that county. Rhea If.
Smith (1925, Mo.) 272 S. W. 964.
Before the act of 1888, supra, federal judgment liens were held to be
coextensive with the territorial jurisdiction of the court. See Metcalf v,.
Watertown (1894) 153 U. S. 671, 678, 14 Sup. Ct. 947, 950. It was
thought that state judgment creditors would gain an unfair preference if
the lien were restricted to the county in which judgment was rendered
since it was believed that Congress had no power to require state offlcials
to file federal judgments in other counties. See Dartmouth Say. Bank if.
Bates (1890, D. Kan.) 44 Fed. 546, 549. Such power, however, would seem
fairly inferable under the full faith and credit clause. Cf. Cook, The
Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (1919) 28
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 421, 432. The inconvenience resulting from the diver-
sity of practice with reference to state and federal judgments and from
the unavailability of the federal judgments in the county of the situs of
the property led to the Act of 1888. See Dartmouth Say. Bank v. Bates,
supra. But the old rule of coextension obtains where there is no state
conformity statute or where such statute does not comply with the terms
of the federal act. Lineker v. Dillon (1921, N. D. Calif.) 275 Fed. 460.
The conformity statute may require enrollment of federal judgments as a
condition precedent to the creation of a lien in the county of rendition if
it imposes a similar requirement in the case of state judgments. In re
Jackson L. & T. Co. (1919, S. D. Miss.) 265 Fed. 389. It has been hold
otherwise, however, where the state judgment gives a lien in the county
of rendition ipso facto. Lineker v. Dillon, supra. One court has met
the difficulty by construing a somewhat ambiguous statute as requiring
the recording of federal judgments only in counties other than that of
rendition. Land Co. v. Hustead (1919) 263 Pa. 342, 106 AtI. 540. This
is the position of the dissent in the principal case. The majority hold that
the requirements of the act are met by putting federal judgments on the
same footing as judgments of state courts which, like the federal courts,
have jurisdiction over more than one county and which, like them, are
not held for the county in which they sit-in other words, on the same
footing as judgments of the state appellate and supreme courts. But by
this holding federal judgments are made liens in a different manner than are
judgments of the only state court of general jurisdiction, and for this
there is no provision in the federal act. Furthermore, it results in an
undesirable diversity in the practice as to state and federal judgments.
While the court's position is a possible one, its propriety seems somewhat
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dubious and it is to be hoped that the United States Supreme Court may
soon have the opportunity to announce an authoritative construction of
the federal act.
MIARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE-ALMioy---JDGMENT DEBT STAruriEs-DEc=ra
FOR PERMANENT ALIMONY NOT LIEN ON Ra,,L PrzoPEnTy FOR INDNI TE
FUTURE INSTALLMENTS NOT DuE-The plaintiff purchased from the de-
fendants property warranted to be free from liens. The wife of one of the
defendants had previously obtained a decree of divorce providing for the
payment of $80 per month as alimony, and for the support of minor
children. The plaintiff sued for breach of warranty, alleging that such
decree constituted a lien on the property conveyed to him. There were no
allegations of past due and unpaid installments. The lower court dis-
missed the complaint. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Bce lcz v'.
Badger (1925, Utah) 240 Pac. 458.
It is generally held that courts have power to make a decree for alimony
a lien on the real estate of the husband. 2 Freeman, Jedgmcn ts (5th ed.
1925) sec. 932. This lien will generally be valid even though the decree
provides for the payment of alimony in installments for an indefinite
period. Murphy v. Moyle (1898) 17 Utah, 113, 53 Pac. 1010; Icaacs v.
Isaacs (1915) 117 Va. 730, 86 S. E. 105; GrIdicy v. Wood (1919) 215 111.
App. 473; contra: Mansfield r. Hill (1910) 56 Or. 400, 107 Pac. 471, 103
Pac. 1007; Casteel v. Casteel (1882) 38 Ark. 477. In the instant case, the
court held that where a decree providing for the payment of installments
over an indefinite period is silent as to liens, there would be a lien for
past due and unpaid installments by virtue of a statute making a money
judgment a lien on property, but not for installments not yet due, bccauye
of the lack of certainty of amount See Enoch v. Walter (1918) 209 Ill.
App. 619. On the other hand, it has been held, where the decree was silent
as to liens, that a decree providing for installments of the latter type
takes precedence over a judgment subsequently docketed against the hus-
band. Buffalo Savings Bank v. Hunt (1909, County Ct) 64 Misc. 643,
118 N. Y. Supp. 1021. And that a trustee takes the property of a bankrupt
subject to the lien for permanent alimony against the bankrupt, both as to
installments in arrears and indefinite future installments. Westimorca;i-d
v. Dodd (1924, C. C. A. 5th) 2 Fed. (2d) 212. Thus it would veem that
the mere fact of future indebtedness should not necessarily preclude the
existence of a lien. It is also generally held that a mortgage to secure
indefinite future advances is valid. 3 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920)
sec. 637. The rule to be applied to the case of a decree awarding alimony
may properly be broader than one applied to an ordinary money judg-
ment under the statute. For an award of alimony creates not merely a
debt, but a debt in discharge of marital obligations. Smith v. Smith (1918)
81 W. Va. 761, 95 S. E. 199; Cain v. Miller (1922) 109 Neb. 441, 191 N. W.
704. Thus it may generally be enforced by attachment for contempt. SSit,
v. Smith, supra; cf. Scott v. Scott (1909) 80 Kan. 489, 103 Pac. 1005. Some
courts, however, limit this remedy to cases where the decrees cannot be
enforced in other ways. Conkflin v. Condliz (1903, 2d Dept.) 125 App.
Div. 280, 109 N. Y. Supp. 189; Andrcws v. Anzdrews (1873) 69 IIl. 609.
Under certain circumstances, the adequate protection of the wife's in-
terests may necessitate the imposition of a lien on the husband's property.
On the other hand, this is an encumbrance which it is impozsible to re-
move, and should not be imposed in all cases as a matter of courze. And
it would seem to be a desirable policy to leave to the discretion of the
judge granting the decree whether such a measure is necessary in the
particular case. Cf. Scott v. Scott, supra. Obviously, this would be the
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effect of the instant holding. Under this rule, it would be advisable for
counsel to request that an award in the form of indefinite future install-
ments be made a lien by the decree itself, if such a lien is desired.
PRACTICE-ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE FOR DIsnAsE-CoMPULSORY PHIYSI-
CAL EXAMINATION BEFORE TRAL.-In an action to annul a marriage on
the ground of concealment of disease, the plaintiff moved to compel the
defendant to submit to a physical examination before trial. Hold, that
the motion would be granted unless the defendant waived her statutory
privilege regarding testimony of physicians who had treated her. Cowcn
v. Cowen (1925, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 125 Misc. 755, 211 N. Y. Supp. 840.
The ecclesiastical courts administering the civil and canon law generally
ordered personal examination in annulment and divorce cases. Briggs V.
Morgan (1820, London, Consist. Ct.) 3 Phill. Ecc. 325; Guznyns v. Camyns,
(1812, London, Consist. Ct.) 2 Phill. Ecc. 10. And at common law such
an examination during trial was directed fairly generally. Orde v. More.
ton (1688, K. B.) 1 Bulst. 130 (to discover infant's age); Case of the Ab.
bott of Strata Meroella (1591, C. P.) 9 Co. Rep. 24a (appeal of mayhem);
In re Blakemore (1845, Ch.) 14 L. J. Eq. (N. S.) 336 (writ of de ventre
inspiciendo to examine widow to protect rightful succession); 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries, *331. To-day the power of the court to order a personal
examination during trial in annulment cases is well recognized. Dovan-
bagk v. Devanbagh (1836, N. Y.) 5 Paige Ch. 553; Newell v. Newcll (1841,
N. Y.) 9 Paige Ch. 25; LeBarro v. LeBarron (1862) 35 Vt. 365; Anony.
'mous (1890) 89 Ala. 291, 7 So. 100; Cahn v. Cahn (1897, Sup. Ct. Spec.
T.) 21 Misc, 506, 48 N. Y. Supp. 173; Gore v. Gore (1905, 3d Dept.) 103
App. Div. 168, 93 N. Y. Supp. 396; Geis v. Geis (1906, 1st Dept.) 116 App.
Div. 362, 101 N. Y. Supp. 845; Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 2220;
(1924) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 444; (1892) 14 L. R. A. 466, note; contra:
2 WEST. L. J. 131. Likewise in personal injury cases. Western Glass
Mfg. Co. v. Schoeninger (1908) 42 Colo. 357, 94 Pac. 342; contra: Denver
C. T. Co. v. Norton (1905, C.C.A. 8th) 141 Fed. 599. In personal injury
cases the court at its discretion has ordered a physical examination even
before the trial. Cook v. Miller (1925) 103 Conn. 267, 130 At. 571; of.
Welch v. Verduin (1923, Sup. Ct.) 121 Misc. 545, 201 N. Y. Supp. 324 (under
N. Y. Laws, 1893, Ch. 721, now N. Y. C. P. A. sec. 306). Examination
before trial in annulment cases, however, was not allowed-presumably
because of the court's reluctance to make such an order unless the trial
showed an absolute necessity for it-a matter which could not be deter-
mined satisfactorily at a preliminary hearing. Anonymous (1901, Sup. Ct.
Spec. T.) 34 Misc. 109, 69 N. Y. Supp. 547; 2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and
Separation (1891) sees. 1298-1315. But it would seem that the same rea-
sons exist also for not allowing examination before trial in personal in-
jury cases. Where there has been previous examination of the party by
competent experts whose evidence is admissible the court will not grant
a motion asking for an examination. Geis v. Geis, supra; Cloud, Physical
Examination in Divorce Proceedings (1901) 35 AM. L. REV. 700. This
result was in effect reached in the instant case through the wording of the
court's decision. The objection that the defendant's physicians might
favor their former patient as much as possible in their testimony was met
by the fact that plaintiff, if necessary, could obtain such an examination
during the trial.
RECEIVERS-RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISMANAGEMENT-OBVIOUSLY INEVITABLE
DEFICIT IN CONTINUING BUSINESS NOT CHARGEABLE TO RECEIVE-.-In re-
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ceivership proceedings, the creditors of the defendant corporation unani-
miously requested that one Richards, because of special qualifications, be
appointed receiver. After running the concern for four months, Richards
discovered that further continuance except under deficit would be impos-
sible. He continued operations, nevertheless, until a creditors' meeting
two weeks later. Certain creditors brought exceptions to Richard's ac-
count, alleging mismanagement. From an order charging him with losses
sustained during these two weeks, Richards appealed. Held, that under
the circumstances this was too extreme a duty to impose upon a mere
"arm of the court", and that the order be reversed. Kcznebcc Boz Co. V.
0. S. Richards Corp. (1925, C. C. A. 2d) 7 Fed. (2d) 290.
Until recent times a receiver's activities were confined to keeping a
business as much as possible in statu quo, while the rights of the parties
concerned were being settled. See Booth v. Clark (1854, U. S.) 17 How.
322, 331; High, Receivers (1876) see. 1; Beach, Reccivecrs (1837) see. 5.
The dependence of the present-day economic organization on the continued
existence of railroads and other public utilities has altered the function
of the receiver in many cases to that of reorganization. See Guscrntee
Trust Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1916, E. D. Mo.) 238 Fed. 812, 315;
Clark v. Bankers Trust Co. (1917, 1st Dept.) 177 App. Div. 627, 638, 161
N. Y. Supp. 544, 551. The instant case exemplifies an extension of the
idea of the receiver as reorganizer to the field of private corporations. Cf.
Rosenberg, Reorganzation-the Next Step (1922) 22 Cor. L. REv. 14. A
need arises, therefore, for receivers having a specialized businezs training
and, in consequence, the scope of such receivers' authority will presumably
be broadened. In one respect, following the general principles of agency,
which seem to guide in receivership cases, this will mean a lesscncd oppor-
tunity for holding a receiver personally responsible. Cf. Villcre v. Vezw
Orleans Milk Co. (1903) 122 La. 717, 48 So. 162; cf. however, Byrnes v.
Missouri Nat'l Bank (1925, C.C.A. 8th) 7 Fed. (2d) 978. But for negli-
gent mismanagement a receiver must, of course, remain personally re-
sponsible. Clark, Receivers (1913) sec. 815. In the ease of corporate di-
rectors, one line of authority, while admittinT a director's perZonal re-
sponsibility for negligence, has refused to extend it to errors of judgment,
however absurd. Spering's Appeal (1372) 71 Pa. 11; King v. Liringt~n
(1915) 192 Ala. 269, 68 So. 897; see Rogers, Powers, Dities aad Li.biliica,
of Corporate Directors (1915) 47 CHic. Lma. Nnws, 382. Such holding
seems due to unwillingness to pry into corporate affairs, and to the negli-
gible amount of the formal salaries paid to directors. See Rhoads, Per-
sonal Liability for Corporate Misnanagemcnt (1916) 65 U. PA. L. Rm,.
128. Another line of authority applies a stricter test, imposing responsi-
bility for "unreasonable" errors of judgment Hin v. Cary (18S0) 82
N. Y. 65; Warren v. RobiSon (1899) 19 Utah, 289, 57 Pac. 237; of. Loan
Socicty v. Eacunson (1915) 248 Pa. 407, 94 At. 121; see Rhoads, op. cit.
137; Lynch, Diligence of Corporate Directors (1914) 3 CAIF. L. RM,. 21.
And there appears to be a statutory tendency towards the requiring of di-
rectors an insurer's responsibility. See N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, cb. 787, £ec.
58; cf. Wesp v. Muckle (1910, 4th Dept.) 136 App. Div. 241, 120 N. Y. Supp.
976. While failure to distinguish business trusts from other trusts has
left the matter uncertain, there are definite indications that the trustee
of a business trust will generally be held responsible for unreasonable
errors in judgment. Cf. Ashley v. Winklcy (1911) 209 Blass. 509, 95 N. E.
932; Holmes v. McDonald (1907) 226 Ill. 169, 80 N. E. 714; Haines v.
Bankers Petroleum Co. (1925, Tex. Civ. App.) 273 S. W. 940; see Sears,
Trust Estates as Business Companies (2d ed. 1921) sec. 100. 'If the re-
ceiver's fault in the instant case is to be considered an error in judgment,
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two reasons exist for applying the stricter test: First, that the size of
the present-day receiver's salary amply warrants such a test. See Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of Private Corporations (1918) sec. 2444. Second, that since
the court cannot be sued, the creditor's remedy can only be against the
receiver personally. These reasons also indicate the propriety of a strict
test of negligence. The facts of the instant case obviously show an error
of judgment or a border line case of negligence. Not to hold the receiver
personally responsible, therefore, seems a tendency in the wrong direction.
Any emphasis on the fact that the creditors urged the appointment of this
particular receiver seems misplaced; there is slight, if any, analogy between
the creditors' action here and the election by shareholders of a director or
trustee.
SALES-CONTRACTS OF "ISALE OR RETURN"-A RETURN MUST BE MADE
AT SELLER'S PLACE OF BusINESS.-The plaintiff vendor in New York City
sold goods to the defendant vendee in St. Albans, Vt., under a contract
of "sale or return". The defendant returned the goods by express. The
package was lost in transit. The plaintiff obtained a judgment for the
value of the goods and the defendant appealed. Held, (one judge dissent-
ing) that the judgment be affirmed on the ground that the delivery should
have been made to the seller's place of business. Biow Co. v. Cohen (1925,
Vt.) 130 At. 589.
In a contract of "sale or return" the so-called "property" in the goods
passes to the buyer on delivery, subject to being revested in the seller at
the buyer's option. Sales Act, sec. 19, rule 3 (1); Ferry & Co. v. Hall
(1914) 188 Ala. 178, 66 So. 104. The term "property" in goods has never
been satisfactorily defined, although one result of "property" passing seems
to be to transfer the risk of loss from seller to buyer. Both at common
law and under sec. 46 (1) of the Sales Act, delivery to the carrier is
deemed to be delivery to the buyer in the absence of a contrary intent or
stipulation; and risk of loss in transit falls on the buyer. State v. Peters
(1897) 91 Me. 31, 39 At. 342; Smith Co. v. Marano (1920) 267 Pa. 107,
110 Atl. 94. Nothing is said in the Sales Act as to what constitutes a "re-
turn" of goods; but in the common law states, where the buyer in one
town returns to the seller in another, under a contract of "sale or return",
the courts have disregarded the presumption that the risk of loss falls on
the consignee when the goods are delivered to the carrier and hold that
the return, to be effective, must be made at the seller's place of business.
White v. Perley (1839) 15 Me. 470; Johnson v. Curlee Co. (1925, Okla.)
240 Pac. 632. The instant case reaches the same decision under the Sales
Act. But the return of goods under a "sale or return" contract has been
held to be a re-sale by buyer to seller. Johnson v. Curlee, supra; Meyer
v. Hodge (1916) 91 Wash. 35, 157 Pac. 42. From this point of view, it
is hard to see why the buyer's delivery to the carrier will not throw risk
of loss in transit on the seller. Such was the contention of the dissenting
opinion in the instant case. Under the common law, where the buyer re-
scinds for breach of warranty and elects to return the goods, the return
must be made at the seller's place of business. Milliken v. Shillings (1896)
89 Me. 180, 36 Atl. 77. But under sec. 69 (3) of the Sales Act, in this
circumstance, it has been held that a physical return of the goods to the
seller is not necessary. Lewenthal v. Lewenthal (1919, 1st Dept.) 180 App.
Div. 167, 178 N. Y. Supp. 252. Apparently the common law analogy ap-
pealed to the court in the principal case. The important point here, as
in all commercial transactions, is to have a clear rule for determining
where the risk of loss shall fall. And in formulating such a rule trade
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usages should be looked to rather than legal precedent or analogy. In the
instant case it is laid down that the return must be made to the seller's
place of business where "no usage to the contrary is shown". This ceems
a satisfactory rule.
TRUSTS--CHARITIES--CY PREs-PRPOSE DEcLAmED BY Fou:.DEP, TO Gov-
E&N DESPITE CHANGING BELIEFS.-In 1807 the Andover Theological Semi-
nary was founded for the avowed purpose of educating ministers in the
orthodox Trinitarian Congregationalist faith. In 1922 a plan for cloZer
affiliation with the Harvard Divinity School was adopted. The Harvard
School, though Unitarian at its inception, is now undenominational. The
Andover Seminary, originally Trinitarian, by 1006 had also "lecome en-
tirely undenominational". Under the plan adopted Harvard professors
would instruct Andover students, although it was expressly required by the
founders of the Seminary that all instruction should be given by otrict
Trinitarians. The Visitors of the Seminary issued a "decree" holding the
plan of affiliation improper as deviating from the declared purpozs3 of the
founders. Proceedings were instituted to test the validity of this "decree".
Held, that the plan for closer affiliation should be declared void. Trietcc3
of Andover Theological Seizawry v. Visitors of Andovcr Thcological wIri-
ttion (1925, alass.) 148 N. E. 900.
When a charitable gift has become impossible of execution as spceifiel,
the courts, rather than decree a failure of the gift will, if a general chari-
table intent appears, direct the trust fund into some other channel under
the familiar cy pres doctrine. Bruce v. Mazwcll (1924) 311 Ill. 479, 1-13
N. E. 82; Trustees of Rush Medical College v. Chicago Univcraity (1924)
312 Ill. 109, 143 N. E. 434. But if no application of the fund be possible
save what is forbidden by the terms of the gift, an intestacy will b
declared. McCran -v. Kay (1922) 93 N. J. Eq 352, 115 At]. 649. Some
courts say that the specified application must be "impossible" before the
ey pres doctrine may be invoked. Crawford v. N"ie, (1910) 224 Dlazs. 474,
113 N. E. 408; Newton v. Healy (1923) 100 Conn. 5, 122 Atl. 654; Cur2Is
& Barker v. Central University of Iowa (1920) 188 Iowa, 300, 176 N. W.
330 (fund left to Baptist college held forfeited by transfer of control to
Reformed Church when retention of Baptist control was impracticable
though not impossible). Other courts say that if the specified application
be "undesirable, impracticable, or contrary to public policy", the cy prea
application will be made. Bnco v. Maxuwell, supra (fund left to build old
men's home, insufficient to build practical home, used to aid existing
home). But in most of the cases announcing this more liberal rule the
fund is not yet in use and its application to the use designated in the gift
would be a foolish waste. Brnce v,. Maxwell, se ra; Christian v. Catholic
Church (1920) 91 N. J. Eq. 374, 110 Atl. 579. When, however, as in the
instant case, the fund has already been applied to the purpoZes of the
gift and the question is one of continuing policy in the execution of the
trust, courts are more reluctant to depart from the strict terms of the gift.
Of course, if a continuation of the policy specified by the testator becomes
impossible, cy pros will, without question, be applied. Whenever changes
in economic conditions or in accepted theological distinctions mahze the
specified policy impractical and inefficient, there is a temptation, resisted
in the instant case, to invoke cy pres. In such cases the courts apply the
cy pres doctrine if it seems to them desirable to do so. In rc Qucc&'
School [1910] 1 Ch. 796 (primary object for school's establishment not
feasible on existing scale without Board of Education's help-court modified
scheme to obtain such help); Inglish v. Johnsoa (1900, Tex. Civ. App.) 95
S. W. 558 (girl's school not feasible-funds used for mixed school); Latch-
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land v. Walker (1899) 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414 (money to be raised by
"ground leases" of land left-form of lease changed because of growing
unpopularity of "ground lease"); Rector of St. James v. Wilson (1913) 82
N. J. Eq. 546, 89 Atl. 519 (fund left to build new church-community
depleted-fund used in support of existing church); see MacKenzie v.
Trustees (1905) 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 61 Atl. 1027 (fund left for church to be
named "Scotch Presbyterian Church of Jersey City" and to use no instru-
mental music-dictum that fund might be used to pay debts of other
Presbyterian churches using instrumental music).
WILLS--JOINT WILLS--PROBATE REFUsED BECAUSE OF IMPROPER EXECIU-
TION BY SURVIVOR DESPITE PROPER EXECUTION By DECEASED.-An instru-
ment, purporting to be the joint and mutual will of a husband and wife
and devising the entire property of each to the survivor, was properly
executed as to the husband, but the wife's signature was not attested in
accordance with the statutory requirements. On the death of the hus-
band before the wife, his heirs at law objected to its admission to probate.
The lower court admitted it and the contestants appealed. Held, that
probate be refused, since a contract to make a joint and mutual will was
to be inferred from the mere existence of the instrument, and the invalid
execution by the wife constituted a failure of consideration for the execu-
tion by the husband. Martin v. Helms (1925, Ill.) 149 N. E. 770.
Joint wills are generally considered as the separate wills of each party.
In re Dies (1872) 50 N. Y. 88; Lewis v. Scofield (1857) 26 Conn. 452;
1 Schouler, Wills (6th ed. 1923) sec. 719. And on such a construction, the
instrument in the instant case should have been admitted to probate.
Some courts, as did the court in the instant case, infer from the mere
attempted execution of a joint and mutual will, that a contract has been
made to execute such an instrument. Frazier v. Patterson (1909) 243 Ill.
80, 90 N. E. 216, (1910) 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 508; Doyle v. Fischer (1924)
183 Wis. 599, 198 N. W. 763; (1919) 32 HARV. L. REV. 296. But the
better rule would seem to require something more to establish the con-
tract. Coveney v. Conlin (1902) 20 App. D. C. 303; see Wanger v. Marr
(1914) 257 Mo. 482, 165 S. W. 1027; Rastetter v. Hoenninger
(1915) 214 N. Y. 66, 72, 108 N. E. 210, 211; (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOUR-
NAL, 709; Schouler, op. cit. sec. 721. Granted, however, the existence in
the instant case of such a contract, still the result does not logically fol-
low. Contracts to make a will in favor of a promisee are enforceable
as are other contracts. The remedy is an action for damages. Frost V.
Tarr (1876) 53 Ind. 390. Or in a proper case, an action for specific per-
formance. Emery v. Darling (1893) 50 Ohio St. 160, 33 N. E. 715.
The remedy is available to the heirs of the promisee and against the
heirs of the promisor. Frazier v. Patterson, supra. It is likewise avail-
able to those who would have been entitled to gifts over under the con.
templated will. Rastetter v. Hoenninger, supra. If, then, the instrument
in the instant case evidences a contract (as the court says it does) it
would seem that any one entitled to an interest thereunder, whether hus-
band, wife, or a third-party beneficiary under the contemplated will,
could enforce the contract against the recalcitrant contractor or his
heirs or personal representative; at least after the decease of the tes-
tator first dying. Campbell v. Dunkelberger (1915) 172 Iowa, 385, 153
N. W. 56; Rastetter v. Hoenninger, supra. The instrument, though fail-
ing as a will, would be a good memorandum under the statute of
frauds, signed, as it was, b both parties to the contract. Williams v.
Williams (1918) 123 Va. 643, 96 S. E. 749; In re MeCGinley's Estate
(1917) 257 Pa. 478, 101 Atl. 807; ef. Canada v. Ihmsen (1925, Wyo.)
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240 Pac. 927, 929. There could be no definitive breach by the wife be-
fore her death. Lawson v. Mullinix (1906) 104 Md. 156, 64 Atl. 93S.
Therefore, although the refusal of probate in the instant case be ac-
cepted, it would still seem that if she came into court tendering per-
formance, she would be entitled to specific relief against the heirs of the
deceased, the successful contestants in the present action. That hcr
performance would now be nugatory because the husband, the only per-
son benefitting under the terms of the contemplated will, is now de-
ceased, should not affect that result; for performance on the date of
the attempted joint will would, in the existing circumstances, have been
equally nugatory. Anderson v. Aizdcrson (1917) 181 Iowa, 573, 104
N. W. 1042; Schouler, op. cit. sec. 723. These facts do, hovever, im-
pugn the soundness of the reason given for the instant decision, viz.,
that the will, though validly executed by the deceased, should never-
theless be refused probate because of a failure of consideration. The
exigency under which the deceased intended his wife to tahe has oc-
curred-to wit, his death-and there is a paper extant, validly signed
and attested, which purports to be his last will. Its status as his will
is independent of any possible breach by the co-contracting party, just
as the validity of a sale is independent of any breach by the buyer of
his duty to pay the purchase money. The dictum apparently relied upon
by the court, that joint and mutual wills, pursuant to contract, must
take effect as to both parties or neither, had reference to a case wherein
the contract contained terms justifying such a construction. Pcwila_
Humane Society v. McJ.rtrie (1907) 229 Ill. 519, 522, 82 N. E. 319,
320. It is submitted that the instrument in the instant case should
have been admitted to probate.
